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You Owe Me

By Ulrike Malmendier and Klaus M. Schmidt

American Economic Review, February 2017

In business and politics, gifts are often aimed at influencing the recipient at the expense of third parties. In an experimental study, which removes informational and incentive confounds, subjects strongly respond to small gifts even though they understa...

Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment

By Sergiu Hart, Ilan Kremer, and Motty Perry

American Economic Review, March 2017

An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of his information, prefers the rew...

Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Tasks with Low Promotability

By Linda Babcock, Maria P. Recalde, Lise Vesterlund, and Laurie Weingart

American Economic Review, March 2017

Gender differences in task allocations may sustain vertical gender segregation in labor markets. We examine the allocation of a task that everyone prefers be completed by someone else (writing a report, serving on a committee, etc.) and find evidence that...

Information Avoidance

By Russell Golman, David Hagmann, and George Loewenstein

Journal of Economic Literature, March 2017

We commonly think of information as a means to an end. However, a growing theoretical and experimental literature suggests that information may directly enter the agent's utility function. This can create an incentive to avoid information, even when it is...