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Showing 641-660 of 777 items.

Homophily in Peer Groups

By Mariagiovanna Baccara and Leeat Yariv

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2013

The focus of this paper is the endogenous formation of peer groups. In our model agents choose peers before making contributions to public projects, and they differ in how much they value one project relative to another. Thus, the group's preference compo...

Spontaneous Discrimination

By Marcin Pęski and Balázs Szentes

American Economic Review, October 2013

We consider a dynamic economy in which agents are repeatedly matched and decide whether or not to form profitable partnerships. Each agent has a physical color and a social color. An agent's social color acts as a signal, conveying information about th...

Middlemen Margins and Globalization

By Pranab Bardhan, Dilip Mookherjee, and Masatoshi Tsumagari

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2013

We study a competitive theory of middlemen with brand-name reputations necessary to overcome product quality moral hazard problems. Agents with heterogeneous abilities sort into different sectors and occupations. Middleman margins do not equalize acros...

Dynamic Deception

By Axel Anderson and Lones Smith

American Economic Review, December 2013

We characterize the unique equilibrium of a competitive continuous time game between a resource-constrained informed player and a sequence of rivals who partially observe his action intensity. Our game adds noisy monitoring and impatient players to Aum...