Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps
- (pp. 469-74)
AbstractThis paper makes a first attempt at building a theory of interim Bayesian persuasion. I work in a minimalist model where a low or high type sender seeks validation from a receiver who is willing to validate high types exclusively. After learning her type, the sender chooses a complete conditional information structure for the receiver from a possibly restricted feasible set. I suggest a solution to this game that takes into account the signaling potential of the sender's choice.
Citation2014. "Interim Bayesian Persuasion: First Steps." American Economic Review, 104 (5): 469-74. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.469
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief