This paper examines the relationship between family ownership and the quality of labor relations. We find that family ownership is more prevalent in countries in which labor relations are hostile, consistent with the notion that family firms are particularly effective at coping with difficult labor relations. Our results are robust to controlling for minority shareholder protection and other potential determinants of family ownership. To address endogeneity issues, we show that, controlling for industry- and country-fixed effects, industries that
are more labor dependent have relatively more family ownership in
countries with worse labor relations. (JEL G32, G34, J52, J53)
Mueller, Holger M., and Thomas Philippon.
"Family Firms and Labor Relations."
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics,
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining
Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence