Information Design and Strategic Communication
- (pp. 51-66)
AbstractI study sender-receiver games where the receiver can disclose information to the sender by designing an information structure. I show that by secretly randomizing over information structures, the receiver can virtually attain her complete information payoff even for large conflicts of interest. The key insight is that private knowledge of the information structure induces truthful communication because it allows the receiver to cross-check the consistency of the sender's report.
CitationKrähmer, Daniel. 2021. "Information Design and Strategic Communication." American Economic Review: Insights, 3 (1): 51-66. DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200012
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness