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Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

By Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Stephen P. Ryan, Paul Schrimpf, and Mark R. Cullen

American Economic Review, February 2013

We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on mora...

Health Reform, Health Insurance, and Selection: Estimating Selection into Health Insurance Using the Massachusetts Health Reform

By Martin B. Hackmann, Jonathan T. Kolstad, and Amanda E. Kowalski

American Economic Review, May 2012

We implement an empirical test for selection into health insurance using changes in coverage induced by the introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our test examines changes in the cost of the newly insured relative to those who were i...

Let Them Have Choice: Gains from Shifting Away from Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and toward an Individual Exchange

By Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho, and Mauricio Varela

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, February 2013

Most nonelderly Americans purchase health insurance through their employers, which sponsor a limited number of plans. Using a panel dataset representing over ten million insured lives, we estimate employees' preferences for different health plans and us...

The Pragmatist's Guide to Comparative Effectiveness Research

[Symposium: Constraining Healthcare Costs]

By Amitabh Chandra, Anupam B. Jena, and Jonathan S. Skinner

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 2011

Following an acrimonious healthcare reform debate involving charges of "death panels," in 2010, Congress explicitly forbade the use of cost-effectiveness analysis in government programs of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. In this context, ...