Search

Showing 581-600 of 744 items.

How Auctions Work for Wine and Art

[Symposium: Auctions]

By Orley Ashenfelter

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1989

At the first wine auction I ever attended, I saw the repeal of the law of one price. This empirical surprise led me to begin collecting data on wine auctions, to interview auctioneers, and even to buy a little wine. In the meantime I have also had the opp...

Retrospectives: Ceteris Paribus

By Joseph Persky

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 1990

In Webster's Dictionary is an example of how to use "ceteris paribus": [S]taple-growing states are, ceteris paribus, more favorable to slave labor than manufacturing states." I suspect it would take a minor treatise to elucidate fully the ceteris paribus ...

Social Learning with Coarse Inference

By Antonio Guarino and Philippe Jehiel

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, February 2013

We study social learning by boundedly rational agents. Agents take a decision in sequence, after observing their predecessors and a private signal. They are unable to make perfect inferences from their predecessors' decisions: they only understand the r...

Public Transfers and Domestic Violence: The Roles of Private Information and Spousal Control

By Gustavo J. Bobonis, Melissa González-Brenes, and Roberto Castro

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, February 2013

We study whether transfer programs in which funds are targeted to women decrease the incidence of spousal abuse. We examine the impact of the Mexican Oportunidades program on spousal abuse rates and threats of violence using data from a specialized sur...

Pandering to Persuade

By Yeon-Koo Che, Wouter Dessein, and Navin Kartik

American Economic Review, February 2013

An agent advises a principal on selecting one of multiple projects or an outside option. The agent is privately informed about the projects' benefits and shares the principal's preferences except for not internalizing her value from the outside option. ...

Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

By Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Stephen P. Ryan, Paul Schrimpf, and Mark R. Cullen

American Economic Review, February 2013

We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral ("moral hazard") response to insurance, a phenomenon we label "selection on mora...

The Case against Patents

[Symposium: Patents]

By Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 2013

The case against patents can be summarized briefly: there is no empirical evidence that they serve to increase innovation and productivity, unless productivity is identified with the number of patents awarded—which, as evidence shows, has no correl...

Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications

By Vincent P. Crawford, Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, and Nagore Iriberri

Journal of Economic Literature, March 2013

Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people's strategic thinking even when a learning justification is implausible. Yet several recent...