School Boards and Education Production: Evidence from Randomized Ballot Order
- (pp. 438-72)
Abstract
We examine the causal influence of educators elected to the school board on local education production. The key empirical challenge is that school board composition is endogenously determined through the electoral process. To overcome this, we develop a novel research design that leverages California's randomized assignment of the order that candidate names appear on election ballots. We find that an additional educator elected to the school board reduces charter schooling and increases teacher salaries in the school district relative to other board members. We interpret these findings as consistent with educator board members shifting bargaining in favor of teachers' unions.Citation
Shi, Ying, and John D. Singleton. 2023. "School Boards and Education Production: Evidence from Randomized Ballot Order." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 15 (1): 438-72. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20200435Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- I21 Analysis of Education
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
- J51 Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
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