American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
no. 1, February 2023
We examine the causal influence of educators elected to the school board on local education production. The key empirical challenge is that school board composition is endogenously determined through the electoral process. To overcome this, we develop a novel research design that leverages California's randomized assignment of the order that candidate names appear on election ballots. We find that an additional educator elected to the school board reduces charter schooling and increases teacher salaries in the school district relative to other board members. We interpret these findings as consistent with educator board members shifting bargaining in favor of teachers' unions.
Shi, Ying, and John D. Singleton.
"School Boards and Education Production: Evidence from Randomized Ballot Order."
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Analysis of Education
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Public Sector Labor Markets
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects