Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy, and Training
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 13,
no. 1, February 2021
(pp. 36-66)
Abstract
Management matters for firms, but what practices are optimal in hierarchical government organizations? And can skilled managers identify them? A large-scale randomized trial conducted with the police of Rajasthan, India, tested four interventions recommended by senior police officers: limitations of transfers, rotation of duties and days off, increased community involvement, and on-duty training. Field experience motivated a fifth intervention: "decoy" visits by enumerators to register cases, incentivizing staff to improve service. Only training and decoy visits had robust impacts; others were poorly implemented and ineffective. Management reforms can improve policing, but even skilled leaders struggle to identify the optimal interventions.Citation
Banerjee, Abhijit, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Daniel Keniston, and Nina Singh. 2021. "Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy, and Training." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 13 (1): 36-66. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190664Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- H76 State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
- J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- J45 Public Sector Labor Markets
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- M53 Personnel Economics: Training
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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