American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
no. 4, November 2022
We model the reporting of sexual misconduct. Individuals underreport misconduct due to strategic uncertainty over whether others will report and corroborate a pattern of behavior. Underreporting occurs if and only if misconduct is widespread. Making sanctions more responsive to reports, raising public awareness of misconduct, implementing confidential holding tanks, and appropriately calibrating damage awards can encourage reporting. However, we also show when such policies are ineffective or backfire. Managers may avoid mentoring subordinates, spilling over into reporting. A holding tank may discourage reporting by raising the bar to access reports. Overall, we highlight several unintended and intended consequences of #MeToo.
Cheng, Ing-Haw, and Alice Hsiaw.
"Reporting Sexual Misconduct in the #MeToo Era."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
Personnel Economics: Labor Management