Reporting Sexual Misconduct in the #MeToo Era
- (pp. 761-803)
Abstract
We model the reporting of sexual misconduct. Individuals underreport misconduct due to strategic uncertainty over whether others will report and corroborate a pattern of behavior. Underreporting occurs if and only if misconduct is widespread. Making sanctions more responsive to reports, raising public awareness of misconduct, implementing confidential holding tanks, and appropriately calibrating damage awards can encourage reporting. However, we also show when such policies are ineffective or backfire. Managers may avoid mentoring subordinates, spilling over into reporting. A holding tank may discourage reporting by raising the bar to access reports. Overall, we highlight several unintended and intended consequences of #MeToo.Citation
Cheng, Ing-Haw, and Alice Hsiaw. 2022. "Reporting Sexual Misconduct in the #MeToo Era." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 14 (4): 761-803. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200218Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- K13 Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- M14 Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
- M54 Personnel Economics: Labor Management
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