Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency
- (pp. 150-78)
Abstract
We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions must be time-inconsistent. We also show that decisions made via non-dictatorial voting methods are intransitive. (JEL D71, D72, D91)Citation
Jackson, Matthew O., and Leeat Yariv. 2015. "Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of Time Inconsistency." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (4): 150-78. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140161Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D15 Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
There are no comments for this article.
Login to Comment