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  4. August 2009
  5. Assignment Messages and Exchanges

Assignment Messages and Exchanges

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Abstract

"Assignment messages" are maximally general messages to describe substitutable preferences by means of a linear program. With "integer assignment messages," there exist integer-valued Walrasian allocations, extending a result of Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik (1971). Any pure Nash equilibrium profile of the Walrasian mechanism with participants limited to assignment messages is also a Nash equilibrium of the unrestricted Walrasian mechanism. Assignment exchanges are generalizations of single-product double auctions and are related to ascending multi-product clock auctions and the Vickrey mechanism. Assignment messages also have additional applications in mechanism design. (JEL D44, D82)

Citation

Milgrom, Paul. 2009. "Assignment Messages and Exchanges." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1 (2): 95-113. DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.2.95

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
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