Optimal Voting Rules
- (pp. 51-64)
AbstractModern social choice theory, following Kenneth Arrow, treats voting as a method for aggregating diverse preferences and values. An earlier view, initiated by Marquis de Condorcet, is that voting is a method for aggregating information. Voters' opinions differ because they make errors of judgment; absent these errors they would all agree on the best choice. The goal is to design a voting rule that identifies the best choice with highest probability. This paper examines maximum likelihood estimation. Surprisingly, the optimal rule can also be axiomatized by variations of Arrow's axioms.
CitationYoung, Peyton. 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (1): 51-64. DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.51
- D72 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior