Behavioral CEOs: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence
AbstractIn this paper, we provide a theoretical and empirical framework that allows us to synthesize and assess the burgeoning literature on CEO overconfidence. We also provide novel empirical evidence that overconfidence matters for corporate investment decisions in a framework that explicitly addresses the endogeneity of firms' financing constraints.
CitationMalmendier, Ulrike, and Geoffrey Tate. 2015. "Behavioral CEOs: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 29 (4): 37-60. DOI: 10.1257/jep.29.4.37
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
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