Analyzing the Airwaves Auction
AbstractThe design of the Federal Communications Commission spectrum license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as whether an open auction or a sealed-bid auction should be used; whether the licenses should be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously; whether the government should allow bids for combinations of licenses or accept only single-license bids; how the auction should should be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms; whether the government should impose royalties or reserve prices; and how much the bidders should be informed about their competition.
CitationMcAfee, R. Preston, and John McMillan. 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1): 159-175. DOI: 10.1257/jep.10.1.159
- L96 Telecommunications
- D44 Auctions
- D45 Rationing; Licensing