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  3. Journal of Economic Literature
  4. March 2018
  5. Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects

Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects

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Abstract

Abundant data has led to new opportunities for empirical auctions research in recent years, with much of the newest work on auctions of multiple objects, including: (1) auctions of ranked objects (such as sponsored search ads), (2) auctions of identical objects (such as Treasury bonds), and (3) auctions of dissimilar objects (such as FCC spectrum licenses). This paper surveys recent developments in the empirical analysis of such auctions.

Citation

Hortaçsu, Ali, and David McAdams. 2018. "Empirical Work on Auctions of Multiple Objects." Journal of Economic Literature, 56 (1): 157-84. DOI: 10.1257/jel.20160961

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • H82 Governmental Property