AEA Papers and Proceedings
ISSN 2574-0768 (Print) | ISSN 2574-0776 (Online)
Sustaining International Rules in a Multipolar World
AEA Papers and Proceedings
(pp. 127–132)
Abstract
We study the sustainability of international trading rules in a multipolar world. A rules-based equilibrium is shaped by three forces. A static temptation to exploit market power undermines cooperation, while two dynamic forces support it: the efficiency gains from rules and the cost of reestablishing the regime once a country becomes hegemonic. When multipolarity is short-lived and involves few coleaders, a strong enough prospect of future hegemony ensures rules cooperation. However, in a more fragmented world, the sustainability of rules is more likely if shared leadership is expected to persist, to ensure long-lasting efficiency gains.Citation
Carvalho, Cecilia, Nicolas Goulart, Daniel Monte, and Emanuel Ornelas. 2026. "Sustaining International Rules in a Multipolar World." AEA Papers and Proceedings 116: 127–132. DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20261016Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- F12 Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F14 Empirical Studies of Trade
- F15 Economic Integration
- F50 International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy: General
- K33 International Law