Voting on the Budget Deficit: Comment

By Ben D. Peletier, Robert A. J. Dur, and Otto H. Swank

American Economic Review, December 1999

The Economics of Child Labor: Comment

By Kenneth A. Swinnerton and Carol Ann Rogers

American Economic Review, December 1999

The Economics of Child Labor: Reply

By Kaushik Basu and Pham Hoang Van

American Economic Review, December 1999

Front Matter

American Economic Review, December 1999

Population, Food, and Knowledge

By D. Gale Johnson

American Economic Review, March 2000

Optimal Adoption of Complementary Technologies

By Boyan Jovanovic and Dmitriy Stolyarov

American Economic Review, March 2000

When a production process requires two extremely complementary inputs, conventional wisdom holds that a firm would always upgrade them simultaneously. We show, however, that if upgrading each input involves a fixed cost, the firm may upgrade them at diffe...

Policy Persistence

By Stephen Coate and Stephen Morris

American Economic Review, December 1999

Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the U.S.-Mexico Border

By Gordon H. Hanson and Antonio Spilimbergo

American Economic Review, December 1999

Longevity Complementarities under Competing Risks

By William H. Dow, Tomas J. Philipson, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin

American Economic Review, December 1999

Intrinsic Bubbles: The Case of Stock Prices: Comment

By Lucy F. Ackert and William C. Hunter

American Economic Review, December 1999

Do Investors Trade Too Much?

By Terrance Odean

American Economic Review, December 1999

New Evidence on the Money's Worth of Individual Annuities

By Olivia S. Mitchell, James M. Poterba, Mark J. Warshawsky, and Jeffrey R. Brown

American Economic Review, December 1999

A Simple Approach for Deciding When to Invest

By Jonathan B. Berk

American Economic Review, December 1999

Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and Some Evidence

By Daron Acemoglu

American Economic Review, December 1999

I present a model where firms decide what types of jobs to create and then search for suitable workers. When there are few skilled workers and the skilled-unskilled productivity gap is small, firms create a single type of job and recruit all workers. An i...

On the Driving Forces behind Cyclical Movements in Employment and Job Reallocation

By Steven J. Davis and John Haltiwanger

American Economic Review, December 1999

Theory restricts short-run job creation and destruction responses and cumulative employment and job reallocation responses to allocative and aggregate shocks. We formulate these restrictions and implement them for postwar data on U.S. manufacturing. Alloc...

Marginal Tax Rates and Income Inequality in a Life-Cycle Model

By David Altig and Charles T. Carlstrom

American Economic Review, December 1999

In this paper we study the quantitative impact of marginal tax rates on the distribution of income. Our methodology builds on computable general-equilibrium framework. We find that distortions from marginal tax rate changes of the sort implied by the Tax ...

Monopoly Rights: A Barrier to Riches

By Stephen L. Parente and Edward C. Prescott

American Economic Review, December 1999

Our thesis is that poor countries are poor because they employ arrangements for which the equilibrium outcomes are characterized by inferior technologies being used, and being used inefficiently. In this paper, we analyze the consequences of one such arra...

Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures

By Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson

American Economic Review, December 1999

Theories of organization of legislatures have mainly focused on the U.S. Congress, explaining why committee systems emerge there, but not explaining variance in organization across legislatures of different countries. To analyze the effects of different c...

On the Size of U.S. Government: Political Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model

By Per Krusell and Jose-Victor Rios-Rull

American Economic Review, December 1999

We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median-voter model of the size of government. Taxes are proportional to total income, and they are redistributed as equal lump-sum transfers. Voting takes place periodically over time, and each consumer ...

Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation

By Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg and Giovanni Maggi

American Economic Review, December 1999

The Grossman-Helpman "Protection for Sale" model, concerning the political economy of trade protection, yields clear predictions for the cross-sectional structure of import barriers. Our objective is to check whether the predictions of the Grossman-Helpma...