Dynamic Preference “Reversals” and Time Inconsistency

By Philipp Strack and Dmitry Taubinsky

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

We study whether it’s possible to identify time-inconsistent preferences in empirical designs where preferences are elicited in advance at time 0, and then again at time 1, after the agent receives additional information. For single-peaked preferences...

Information and the Formation of Inflation Expectations by Firms: Evidence from a Survey of Israeli Firms

By Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Ari Kutai, and Rafi Melnick

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics

We analyze how firms form their inflation expectations after a regime change in monetary policy and a transition to a low-inflation environment. Utilizing the Bank of Israel’s survey of firms, we document the basic properties of firms’ inflation expec...

Screening Adaptive Cartels

By Juan Ortner, Sylvain Chassang, and Kei Kawai

American Economic Review: Insights

We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regu- lators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. Our main result establishes ...

Health Sector Structural Change

By Nick Pretnar and Maria Feldman

American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics

The U.S. health-services sector has grown both in terms of its expenditure share and relative price. Using a two-sector general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous population, we find that relative price growth is almost enti...

The Effects of Sin Taxes and Advertising Restrictions in a Dynamic Equilibrium

By Rossi Abi-Rafeh, Pierre Dubois, Rachel Griffith, and Martin O’Connell

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

We develop a dynamic equilibrium model of firm competition to analyze the effects of counterfactual policies, such as taxes and advertising restrictions, on pricing, advertising, consumption, and welfare. Using micro-level data, we estimate how consume...

Exploiting Rivals’ Strengths

By Giacomo Calzolari and Vincenzo Denicolò

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

We analyze oligopolistic competition in which firms use contracts contingent on what buyers purchase from their rivals. We present a new mechanism through which a dominant firm, by using these contracts, can gain more from exploiting its rivals than fr...

Higher-Order Beliefs and (Mis)learning from Prices

By Kevin He and Jonathan Libgober

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

We study misperceptions of private-signal correlation in an incomplete-information Cournot duopoly game. Exaggerating the correlation between players’ demand signals is beneficial when agents hold flexible beliefs about price elasticity, but harmful w...

Intimate Partner Violence in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: Insights from Economic Research

By Manisha Shah and Lydia Barski

Journal of Economic Literature

Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a pervasive global issue, with approximately one in three women experiencing IPV over their lifetime. IPV prevalence is higher in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), and costs of IPV are also considerably larger as...

Annual Meeting Registration and Other Announcements

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September 03, 2025

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AEA Elections and Other Announcements

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October 03, 2025

View the AEA Member Announcement from October 6th, 2025.

Don’t Miss Out on the AEA Program at the ASSA Annual Meeting

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October 28, 2025

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Front Matter

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2025

Does Public Competition Crowd Out Private Investment? Evidence from Municipal Provision of Internet Access

By Kyle Wilson

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2025

Government infrastructure investment may crowd out investment from private firms or induce them to invest preemptively. The tension between these effects underlies the policy debate over municipal provision of internet access. I estimate demand for broadb...

Optimal Voting Mechanisms on Generalized Single-Peaked Domains

By Tobias Rachidi

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2025

This paper studies the design of voting mechanisms. There are multiple alternatives, and the voters have generalized single-peaked preferences derived from median spaces as introduced in Nehring and Puppe (2007b). This class of preferences covers a wide r...

Common Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry

By Melissa Newham, Jo Seldeslachts, and Albert Banal-Estañol

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2025

Common ownership—where several firms are (partially) owned by the same investors—and its impact on product market competition has recently drawn much attention. This paper focuses on its implications for market entry. We consider the entry decisions o...

Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Naïvety

By Takeshi Murooka and Takuro Yamashita

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2025

We study an adverse selection environment in which a buyer's inferential ability is heterogeneous: A rational type correctly infers the value of the good from a seller's offer, whereas a naïve type is inattentive to the correlation between the seller's p...

Dynamic Screening and the Dual Roles of Monitoring

By Dhruva Bhaskar

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2025

This paper studies monitoring in long-term, self-enforcing relationships with adverse selection and moral hazard. Monitoring is used to screen low types by incentivizing them to shirk. Once high types have been identified, monitoring is used both to incen...

Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms

By Ryo Shirakawa

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2025

Market design mechanisms are often required to be strategy proof, ensuring that no misreporting is profitable. This, however, may be overly restrictive: Real-world participants may be unable to engage in complex misreporting. In the context of school choi...

Holding Platforms Liable

By Xinyu Hua and Kathryn E. Spier

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2025

Should platforms be liable for harms suffered by users? A platform enables interactions between firms and users. Harmful firms impose larger costs on users than safe firms. If firms have deep pockets and are fully liable for harms, platform liability is u...

Social Learning and Strategic Pricing with Rating Systems

By Chia-Hui Chen, Kong-Pin Chen, and Junichiro Ishida

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2025

Rating systems, widely used in online transactions, often reduce buyers' diverse opinions to summary statistics. To explore the consequences of this coarse aggregation, we analyze a dynamic adverse selection model where buyers share anonymous evaluations ...