Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcome

By Nicola Lacetera, Bradley J. Larsen, Devin G. Pope, and Justin R. Sydnor

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2016

Auction design has been studied extensively; however, within a given design, does the process of how an auction is conducted matter as well? We address this question by looking for heterogeneity in the performance of auctioneers in English auctions. We an...

Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games

By Jakša Cvitanić and George Georgiadis

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, November 2016

We analyze a game in which a group of agents exerts costly effort over time to make progress on a project. The project is completed once the cumulative effort reaches a prespecified threshold, at which point it generates a lump-sum payoff. We characterize...

Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts

By Malin Arve and David Martimort

American Economic Review, November 2016

We characterize the optimal dynamic contract for a long-term basic service when an uncertain add-on is required later on. Introducing firm risk aversion has two impacts. Profits for the basic service can be backloaded to induce cheaper information revelat...

Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values

By Daniel F. Garrett

American Economic Review, November 2016

We study the profit-maximizing price path of a monopolist selling a durable good to buyers who arrive over time and whose values for the good evolve stochastically. The setting is completely stationary with an infinite horizon. Contrary to the case with c...