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Auditability in School Choice

By Aram Grigoryan and Markus Möller

AEA Papers and Proceedings, May 2024

In centralized public school admissions, participants may not fully observe other participants' preference rankings and priorities. In this paper, we evaluate prominent assignment rules in terms of their auditability properties. We show that Serial Dictat...

Optimal Income Taxation

By Louis Kaplow

Journal of Economic Literature, June 2024

This article explores subjects in optimal income taxation characterized by recent research interest, practical importance in light of concerns about inequality, potential for misunderstanding, and prospects for advancement. Throughout the analysis, path...

Monitoring Teams

By Marina Halac, Ilan Kremer, and Eyal Winter

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2024

A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, each delivering a signal of joint performanc...

Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions

By Fabian Dvorak and Sebastian Fehrler

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2024

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication is a key factor for cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how communication affects cooperati...

Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers

By Andrew Sweeting, Xuezhen Tao, and Xinlu Yao

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2024

We model repeated pricing by differentiated product firms when each firm has private information about its serially correlated marginal cost. In a fully separating equilibrium of the dynamic game, signaling incentives can lead equilibrium prices to be sig...

Buying from a Group

By Nima Haghpanah, Aditya Kuvalekar, and Elliot Lipnowski

American Economic Review, August 2024

A buyer procures a good owned by a group of sellers whose heterogeneous cost of trade is private information. The buyer must either buy the whole good or nothing, and sellers share the transfer in proportion to their share of the good. We characterize the...

Experimentation in Networks

By Simon Board and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn

American Economic Review, September 2024

We propose a model of strategic experimentation on social networks in which forward-looking agents learn from their own and neighbors' successes. In equilibrium, private discovery is followed by social diffusion. Social learning crowds out own experimenta...

Comparisons of Signals

By Benjamin Brooks, Alexander Frankel, and Emir Kamenica

American Economic Review, September 2024

A signal is a description of an information source that specifies both its correlation with the state and its correlation with other signals. Extending Blackwell (1953), we characterize when one signal is more valuable than another regardless of preferenc...