Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty

By Pierpaolo Battigalli, Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Fabio Maccheroni, and Massimo Marinacci

American Economic Review, February 2015

We analyze a notion of self-confirming equilibrium with non-neutral ambiguity attitudes that generalizes the traditional concept. We show that the set of equilibria expands as ambiguity aversion increases. The intuition is quite simple: by playing the ...

Team Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles

By Qiang Fu, Jingfeng Lu, and Yue Pan

American Economic Review, July 2015

We consider a multi-battle team contest in which players from two rival teams form pairwise matches to fight in distinct component battles, which are carried out sequentially or (partially) simultaneously. A team wins if and only if its players win a majo...

Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

By Yves Breitmoser

American Economic Review, September 2015

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, predictions are notoriously difficult. Recently, however, Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011)—henceforth, BOS‐showed that experimental subjects predictably cooperate when the discount factor exceeds a par...

Conveniently Upset: Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others' Altruism

By Rafael Di Tella, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Andres Babino, and Mariano Sigman

American Economic Review, November 2015

We present results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that recipients can take a side payment in exchange for accepting a reduction in the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to be able to take more of the recipient's...

Capital Tax Reform and the Real Economy: The Effects of the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut

By Danny Yagan

American Economic Review, December 2015

This paper tests whether the 2003 dividend tax cut—one of the largest reforms ever to a US capital tax rate—stimulated corporate investment and increased labor earnings, using a quasi-experimental design and US corporate tax returns from years...

Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments: Comment

By Michal Krawczyk and Fabrice Le Lec

American Economic Review, March 2016

Based on experimental dictator games with probabilistic prospects, Brock, Lange, and Ozbay (2013) conclude that neither ex post nor ex ante comparisons can fully account for observed behavior. We argue that their conclusion that ex ante comparisons can...

Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments: Reply

By J. Michelle Brock, Andreas Lange, and Erkut Y. Ozbay

American Economic Review, March 2016

In Brock, Lange, and Ozbay (2013), we experimentally investigate social preferences under risk. One of our conclusions is that a social preference model incorporating both ex ante and ex post fairness concerns may best describe behavior. Krawczyk and L...

Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games

By John H. Kagel and Peter McGee

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2016

In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results from the psychology literature. This quickly gives way to teams cooperating more than individuals. Team di...

Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission

By Rossella Argenziano, Sergei Severinov, and Francesco Squintani

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, August 2016

This paper explores the implications of costly information acquisition in a strategic communication setting. We show that equilibrium decisions based on a biased expert's advice may be more precise than when information is directly acquired by the decisio...