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Mandatory Retirement for Judges Improved the Performance of US State Supreme Courts

  • Elliott Ash
  • W. Bentley MacLeod
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 16, no. 1, February 2024
(pp. 518-48)
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Abstract

This paper provides evidence on how mandatory retirement influences judge performance using reforms in US state supreme courts as a natural experiment. We find that introducing mandatory retirement improves court performance as measured by output (number of opinions) and legal influence (number of citations to opinions). While older judges are cited less than younger judges, the effect of mandatory retirement is larger than what is expected from a change in the age distribution. We find some evidence that the additional effect is due to selective attrition and that the presence of older judges reduces the performance of younger judges.

Citation

Ash, Elliott, and W. Bentley MacLeod. 2024. "Mandatory Retirement for Judges Improved the Performance of US State Supreme Courts." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 16 (1): 518-48. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210667

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • H76 State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
  • J14 Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-labor Market Discrimination
  • J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
  • J26 Retirement; Retirement Policies
  • K40 Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
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