Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 13,
no. 3, August 2021
(pp. 1-27)
Abstract
During the 2008 to 2012 period, the US Border Patrol enacted new sanctions on migrants apprehended while attempting to enter the United States illegally. Using administrative records on apprehensions of Mexican nationals that include fingerprint-based IDs and other details, we detect if an apprehended migrant is subject to penalties and if he is later reapprehended. Exploiting plausibly random variation in the rollout of sanctions, we estimate econometrically that exposure to penalties reduced the 18-month reapprehension rate for males by 4.6 to 6.1 percentage points off of a baseline rate of 24.2 percent. These magnitudes imply that sanctions can account for 28 to 44 percent of the observed decline in recidivism in apprehensions. Further results suggest that the drop in recidivism was associated with a reduction in attempted illegal entry.Citation
Bazzi, Samuel, Gordon Hanson, Sarah John, Bryan Roberts, and John Whitley. 2021. "Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 13 (3): 1-27. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20190291Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- J15 Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
- J18 Demographic Economics: Public Policy
- K37 Immigration Law
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