The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives
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Abstract
We investigate the use of high-powered incentives for the Colombian military and show that this practice produced perverse side effects. Innocent civilians were killed and misrepresented as guerillas (a phenomenon known in Colombia as "false positives"). There were significantly more false positives during the period of high-powered incentives in municipalities with weaker judicial institutions and where a higher share of brigades were commanded by colonels, who have stronger career concerns than generals. In municipalities with a higher share of colonels, the high-powered incentives period also coincided with a worsening of local judicial institutions and no discernible improvement in overall security.Citation
Acemoglu, Daron, Leopoldo Fergusson, James Robinson, Dario Romero, and Juan F. Vargas. 2020. "The Perils of High-Powered Incentives: Evidence from Colombia's False Positives." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 12 (3): 1-43. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180168Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K41 Litigation Process
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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