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  3. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
  4. August 2020
  5. Criminal Deterrence When There Are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras, Vehicular Accidents, and Public Safety

Criminal Deterrence When There Are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras, Vehicular Accidents, and Public Safety

  • Justin Gallagher
  • Paul J. Fisher
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 12, no. 3, August 2020
(pp. 202-37)
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Abstract

Numerous cities have enacted electronic monitoring programs at traffic intersections in an effort to reduce the high number of vehicle accidents. The rationale is that the higher expected fines for running a red light will induce drivers to stop and lead to fewer cross-road collisions. However, the cameras also incentivize drivers to accept a greater accident risk from stopping. We evaluate the termination of a monitoring program via a voter referendum using 12 years of geocoded police accident data. We find that the cameras changed the composition of accidents but no evidence of a reduction in total accidents or injuries.

Citation

Gallagher, Justin, and Paul J. Fisher. 2020. "Criminal Deterrence When There Are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras, Vehicular Accidents, and Public Safety." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 12 (3): 202-37. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170674

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
  • R41 Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
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