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  4. February 2018
  5. Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance

Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance

  • Miguel Almunia
  • David Lopez-Rodriguez
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 10, no. 1, February 2018
(pp. 1-38)
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Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of size-dependent tax enforcement on firms' tax compliance. We exploit quasi-experimental variation generated by a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in Spain, which monitors firms with more than €6 million in reported revenue. Firms strategically bunch below the eligibility threshold in order to avoid stricter tax enforcement. The response is stronger in sectors where transactions leave more paper trail, suggesting that monitoring effort and the traceability of information reported by firms are complements. We estimate that there would be substantial welfare gains from extending stricter tax monitoring to smaller businesses.

Citation

Almunia, Miguel, and David Lopez-Rodriguez. 2018. "Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10 (1): 1-38. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20160229

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • H25 Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
  • H26 Tax Evasion and Avoidance
  • H32 Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm
  • L25 Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
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