An important but under-explored issue in student assignment procedures is heterogeneity in the level of strategic sophistication among students. Our work provides the first direct measure of which students rank schools following their true preference order (sincere students) and which rank schools by manipulating their true preferences (sophisticated students). We present evidence that our proxy for sophistication captures systematic differences among students. Our results demonstrate that sophisticated students are 9.6 percentage points more likely to be assigned to one of their preferred schools. Further, we show that this large difference in assignment probability occurs because sophisticated students systematically avoid over-demanded schools.
Dur, Umut, Robert G. Hammond, and Thayer Morrill.
"Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms."
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Analysis of Education
Education: Government Policy