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  3. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
  4. February 2018
  5. Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners' Nationality and Budget Allocation in the European Union

Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners' Nationality and Budget Allocation in the European Union

  • Kai Gehring
  • Stephan A. Schneider
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 10, no. 1, February 2018
(pp. 214-39)
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Abstract

We demonstrate that the nationalities of EU Commissioners influence budget allocation decisions in favor of their country of origin. Our focus is on the Commissioners for Agriculture, who are exclusively responsible for a specific fund that accounts for the largest share of the overall EU budget. On average, providing the Commissioner causes a 1 percentage point increase in a country's share of the overall EU budget, which corresponds to 850 million euros per year. There are no different pretreatment trends and the magnitude of the bias from selection-on-unobservables would have to be implausibly high to account for the estimated coefficient.

Citation

Gehring, Kai, and Stephan A. Schneider. 2018. "Towards the Greater Good? EU Commissioners' Nationality and Budget Allocation in the European Union." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10 (1): 214-39. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20160038

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • F55 International Institutional Arrangements
  • H61 National Budget; Budget Systems
  • H77 Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
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