Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India
- (pp. 262-90)
Abstract
Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption. The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption.Citation
Hanna, Rema, and Shing-Yi Wang. 2017. "Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9 (3): 262-90. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20150029Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C91 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H83 Public Administration; Public Sector Accounting and Audits
- K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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