Water Pollution Progress at Borders: The Role of Changes in China's Political Promotion Incentives
- (pp. 223-42)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
At political boundaries, local leaders have weak incentives to reduce polluting activity because the social costs are borne by downstream neighbors. This paper exploits a natural experiment set in China in which the central government changed the local political promotion criteria and thus incentivized local officials to reduce border pollution along specific criteria. We document evidence of pollution progress with respect to targeted criteria at province boundaries. Heavy metal pollutants, not targeted by the central government, have not decreased in concentration after the regime shift. Using data on the economic geography of key industrial water polluters, we explore possible mechanisms. (JEL D72, O13, O18, P25, P28, Q25, Q53)Citation
Kahn, Matthew E., Pei Li, and Daxuan Zhao. 2015. "Water Pollution Progress at Borders: The Role of Changes in China's Political Promotion Incentives." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7 (4): 223-42. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20130367Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O13 Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
- O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
- P25 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
- P28 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Natural Resources; Energy; Environment
- Q25 Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
- Q53 Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
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