AEA Papers and Proceedings
ISSN 2574-0768 (Print) | ISSN 2574-0776 (Online)
Can Automatic Retention Improve Health Insurance Market Outcomes?
AEA Papers and Proceedings
vol. 111,
May 2021
(pp. 560–66)
Abstract
There is growing interest in market design using default rules and other "choice architecture" principles to steer consumers toward desirable outcomes. Using data from Massachusetts's health insurance exchange, we study an "automatic retention" policy intended to prevent coverage interruptions among low-income enrollees. Rather than disenroll people who lapse in paying premiums, the policy automatically switches them to an available free plan until they actively cancel or lose eligibility. We find that automatic retention has a sizable impact, switching 14 percent of consumers annually and differentially retaining healthy, low-cost individuals. The results illustrate the power of defaults to shape insurance coverage outcomes.Citation
McIntyre, Adrianna, Mark Shepard, and Myles Wagner. 2021. "Can Automatic Retention Improve Health Insurance Market Outcomes?" AEA Papers and Proceedings 111: 560–66. DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20211083Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
- G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions