AEA Papers and Proceedings
ISSN 2574-0768 (Print) | ISSN 2574-0776 (Online)
The Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership: The Case of Paragraph IV Generic Entry
AEA Papers and Proceedings
vol. 110,
May 2020
(pp. 569–72)
Abstract
Brand-name pharmaceutical companies often file lawsuits against generic drug manufacturers that challenge the monopoly status of patent-protected drugs. Institutional horizontal shareholdings, measured by the generic shareholders' ownership in the brand-name company relative to their ownership in the generic manufacturer, are significantly positively associated with the likelihood that the two parties enter into a settlement agreement in which the brand pays the generic manufacturer to stay out of the market.Citation
Xie, Jin, and Joseph Gerakos. 2020. "The Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership: The Case of Paragraph IV Generic Entry." AEA Papers and Proceedings 110: 569–72. DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20201029Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- G24 Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
- G32 Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L13 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L65 Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
- O34 Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital