We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where
cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play if players share
an understanding that cheating will be punished. Consistent with
communication acting as a coordinating device, credible preplay
threats to punish cheating are the most effective message to facilitate
collusion. Promises to collude also improve cooperation. Credible
threats do not occur in a treatment with a limited message space
that permits threats of punishment. Contrary to some theoretical
predictions, renegotiation possibilities facilitate collusion.
Cooper, David J., and Kai-Uwe Kühn.
"Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies