We propose an axiomatic approach for equilibrium selection in the discounted, infinitely repeated symmetric Prisoner's Dilemma. Our
axioms characterize a unique selection criterion that is also useful as a tool for applied comparative statics exercises as it results in a critical discount factor δ* strictly larger than δ, the standard criterion that has often been used in applications. In an experimental test we find a strong predictive power of our proposed criterion. For parameter changes where the standard and our criterion predict differently, changes in observed cooperation follow predictions based on δ* . (JEL C72, C73, C92, D81)
"Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty