Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs
AbstractMost institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others' cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects.
CitationEngl, Florian, Arno Riedl, and Roberto Weber. 2021. "Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13 (4): 261-99. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180336
- C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D02 Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- H41 Public Goods