Designing Dynamic Research Contests
- (pp. 270-89)
AbstractThis paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best.
CitationBenkert, Jean-Michel, and Igor Letina. 2020. "Designing Dynamic Research Contests." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 12 (4): 270-89. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180263
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- O32 Management of Technological Innovation and R&D