American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Nonnegative Price Constraints
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 13,
no. 1, February 2021
(pp. 283–337)
Abstract
Motivated by recent antitrust cases in markets with zero-pricing, we develop a leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets. In the presence of the nonnegative price constraint, the Chicago school critique of tie-ins fails to hold. In the independent products case, tying provides a mechanism to circumvent the constraint in the tied market without inviting aggressive responses by the rival firm. In the complementary products case, the "price squeeze" mechanism cannot be used to extract surplus from the more efficient rival firm without tying. We identify conditions under which tying in two-sided markets is profitable and explore its welfare implications.Citation
Choi, Jay Pil, and Doh-Shin Jeon. 2021. "A Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Nonnegative Price Constraints." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (1): 283–337. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180234Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D42 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
- K21 Antitrust Law
- L12 Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L41 Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices