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  5. Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure

Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure

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Abstract

This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback.

Citation

Jin, Ginger Zhe, Michael Luca, and Daniel Martin. 2021. "Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13 (2): 141-73. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180217

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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