This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value.
Guo, Huiyi, and Nicholas C. Yannelis.
"Full Implementation under Ambiguity."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design