Information Transmission under the Shadow of the Future: An Experiment
- (pp. 75-98)
Abstract
We experimentally examine how information transmission functions in an ongoing relationship. Where the one-shot cheap-talk literature documents substantial overcommunication and preferences for honesty, the outcomes in our repeated setting are more consistent with uninformative babbling outcomes. This is particularly surprising, as honest revelation is supportable as an equilibrium outcome in our repeated setting. We show that inefficient outcomes are driven by a coordination failure on how to distribute the gains from information sharing. However, when agents can coordinate on the payment of an "information rent," honest revelation emerges.Citation
Wilson, Alistair J., and Emanuel Vespa. 2020. "Information Transmission under the Shadow of the Future: An Experiment." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 12 (4): 75-98. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170403Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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