Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project and collectively decide its scale. A larger scale requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon
completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scale, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent's preferred scale shrinks
(expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We find that an agent's degree of efficiency is a key determinant of
control over the project scale. From a welfare perspective, it may be desirable to allocate decision rights to the inefficient agent.
Bowen, T. Renee, George Georgiadis, and Nicolas S. Lambert.
"Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate