American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
no. 3, August 2019
Sonmez (2013) and Sonmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sonmez and Sonmez-Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as descending salary adjustment processes in Kelso-Crawford (1982) economies in which cadets are (grossly) substitutable. The lengths of service contracts serve as (inverse) salaries. The underlying substitutability explains the unilateral substitutability of the priorities utilized by Sonmez and Sonmez-Switzer.
"Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Public Sector Labor Markets