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  3. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
  4. November 2016
  5. Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution

Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution

  • Andrzej Baranski
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 8, no. 4, November 2016
(pp. 149-73)
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Abstract

I study a multilateral bargaining game in which committee members invest in a common project prior to redistributing the total value of production. The game corresponds to a Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative bargaining model preceded by a production stage that is similar to a voluntary contribution mechanism. In this game, contributions reach almost full efficiency in a random rematching experimental design. Bargaining outcomes tend to follow an equity standard of proportionality: higher contributors obtain higher shares. Unlike other bargaining experiments with an exogenous fund, allocations involving payments to all members are modal instead of minimum winning coalitions, and proposer power is quite low.

Citation

Baranski, Andrzej. 2016. "Voluntary Contributions and Collective Redistribution." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8 (4): 149-73. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140240

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
  • D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • H41 Public Goods
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