Information and Extremism in Elections
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 7,
no. 1, February 2015
(pp. 165-207)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
We model an election in which parties nominate candidates with observable policy preferences prior to a campaign that produces information about candidate quality, a characteristic independent of policy. Informative campaigns lead to greater differentiation in expected candidate quality, which undermines policy competition. In equilibrium, as campaigns become more informative, candidates become more extreme. We identify conditions under which the costs associated with extremism dominate the benefits of campaign information. Informative political campaigns increase political extremism and can decrease voter welfare. Our results have implications for media coverage, the number of debates, and campaign finance reform. (JEL D72, D83)Citation
Boleslavsky, Raphael, and Christopher Cotton. 2015. "Information and Extremism in Elections." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (1): 165-207. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130006Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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