American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
no. 1, February 2010
We combine survey data on friendship networks and individual
characteristics with experimental observations from dictator games.
Dictator offers are primarily explained by social distance, giving
follows a simple inverse distance law. While student demographics
play a minor role in explaining offer amounts, individual heterogeneity
is important for network formation. In particular, we detect
significant homophilous behavior; students connect to others similar
to themselves. Moreover, the network data reveal a strong preference
for cliques, students connect to those already close. The study is one
of the first to identify network architecture with individual behavior
in a strategic context. (JEL D44, H82)
Goeree, Jacob K., Margaret A. McConnell, Tiffany Mitchell, Tracey Tromp, and Leeat Yariv.
"The 1/d Law of Giving."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,