American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 1,
no. 1, February 2009
(pp. 237–67)
Abstract
How can consumers be assured that firms will endeavor to provide good quality when quality is unobservable prior to purchase? We test the hypothesis that reputational incentives are effective at causing restaurants to maintain good hygiene quality. We find that chain affiliation provides reputational incentives and franchised units tend to free-ride on chain reputation. We also show that regional variation in the degree of repeat customers affects the strength of reputational incentives for good hygiene at both chain and nonchain restaurants. Despite these incentives, a policy intervention in the form of posted hygiene grade cards causes significant improvements in restaurant hygiene. (JEL I18, I19, L14, L83).Citation
Jin, Ginger Zhe, and Phillip Leslie. 2009. "Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1 (1): 237–67. DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.1.237Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- I19 Health: Other
- L14 Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
- L83 Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism