A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas
AbstractThis paper studies the impact of gender quotas for corporate board seats on corporate decisions. We examine the introduction of Norway's 2006 quota, comparing affected firms to other Nordic companies, public and private, that are unaffected by the rule. We find that affected firms undertake fewer workforce reductions than comparison firms, increasing relative labor costs and employment levels and reducing short-term profits. The effects are strongest among firms without female board members beforehand and are present even for boards with older and more experienced members afterward. The boards appear to be affecting corporate strategy in part by selecting like-minded executives.
CitationMatsa, David A., and Amalia R. Miller. 2013. "A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 5 (3): 136-69. DOI: 10.1257/app.5.3.136
- G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
- J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- J78 Labor Discrimination: Public Policy
- M12 Personnel Management; Executive Compensation
- M51 Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions