This paper studies the impact of gender quotas for corporate
board seats on corporate decisions. We examine the introduction of
Norway's 2006 quota, comparing affected firms to other Nordic companies,
public and private, that are unaffected by the rule. We find
that affected firms undertake fewer workforce reductions than comparison
firms, increasing relative labor costs and employment levels
and reducing short-term profits. The effects are strongest among
firms without female board members beforehand and are present
even for boards with older and more experienced members afterward.
The boards appear to be affecting corporate strategy in part
by selecting like-minded executives.
"A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas."
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
Labor Discrimination: Public Policy
Personnel Management; Executive Compensation
Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions