This paper estimates the impact of a large anti-poverty cash transfer program, the Uruguayan PANES, on political support for the government
that implemented it. Using the discontinuity in program assignment based on a pretreatment eligibility score, we find that beneficiary households are 11 to 13 percentage points more likely to favor the current government relative to the previous government. Political support effects persist after the program ends. Our
results are consistent with theories of rational but poorly informed voters who use policy to infer politicians' redistributive preferences or competence, as well as with behavioral economics explanations grounded in reciprocity. (JEL D72, H23, H53, I38, O15, O17)
Manacorda, Marco, Edward Miguel, and Andrea Vigorito.
"Government Transfers and Political Support."
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
Welfare and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements