In 2004, the Hugo Chávez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of
several million voters who had attempted to remove him from office
throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Chávez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Chávez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in earnings and a 1.3 percentage point drop in employment rates after the voter list was released. (JEL D72, O17)
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, Edward Miguel, Daniel Ortega, and Francisco Rodriguez.
"The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta."
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements